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ABSTRACT: As at 30 September 2013 13 per cent of the prison population in England and Wales 
were foreign national offenders. Convicted UK nationals are also serving prison sentences in 
foreign jurisdictions. The UK government has taken measures such as the enactment of 
domestic legislation and the ratification of bilateral and multilateral agreements with other States 
for the specific purpose of facilitating the return of its citizens to serve their sentences at home. 
Many offenders have been transferred to the UK to serve their sentences. This article highlights 
and examines some of the human rights issues that have exercised UK courts in this endeavour.  
 
1. Introduction 
The United Kingdom Ministry of Justice reported that as at 30 September  2013 13 per cent of 
the total prison population in England and Wales comprised of foreign nationals1 and over 1000 
UK nationals were serving prison terms abroad.2 In order to ensure that foreign national 
offenders are transferred to serve the last part of their sentences in their home countries and also 
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1 See Ministry of Justice, ‘Offender management statistics (quarterly) – April to June 2013’ published 31 October 
2013 at <www.gov.uk/government/publications/offender-management-statistics-quarterly-april-to-june-2013> 
accessed 29 December 2013.  For a discussion of how foreign national prisoners are managed in the UK see Laura 
Dubinsky, Hamish Arnott and Alasdair Mackenzie, Foreign National Prisoners: Law and Practice (LAG 2012) 525-537. 
2 See Prisoners Abroad at <www.prisonersabroad.org.uk/> accessed 29 December 2013; see also ‘Over 1,000 
Britons are jailed over drugs abroad’ BBC News (London, 3 February 2010) at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8493551.stm> accessed 29 December 2013. In June 2014 a Private 
Member’s Bill, Foreign National Offenders (Exclusion from the United Kingdom) Bill, was presented by Mr Phillip 
Hollobone, to The House of Commons and its broad objective is ‘to make provision to exclude from the United 
Kingdom foreign nationals found guilty of a criminal offence committed in the United Kingdom.’ The Bill requires 
the Secretary of State ‘make provision in regulations for any foreign national convicted in any court of law of a 
qualifying offence to be excluded from the United Kingdom’ (Clause 1(1). If passed in its current form, it will have 
far reaching consequences for foreign offenders in the UK as any person who is not a British citizen who is 
convicted by any court for any offence by which a term of imprisonment may be imposed shall be deprived of any 
right to remain in the UK. However, the discussion of the Bill falls outside the scope of this article. For a copy of 
the Bill, see <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2013-2014/0035/14035.pdf> accessed 29 December 
2013. 
J.D. Mujuzi UK Practice on transfer of sentenced offendersSPILJ Vol.1 No.1 (2014) 73-96 
State Practice & International Law Journal Vol.1 No.1 (2014) Page 74 
 
for UK nationals or citizens to be transferred to serve their sentences in the UK,3 the UK 
government has signed bilateral prisoner transfer agreements with several African, Asian and 
Latin American countries4 and ratified several international agreements, including the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons,5 the Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons,6 the Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted 
                                                          
3 For an offender to be transferred to the UK to serve his or sentence, most of the agreements provide that he/she 
has to be a national or citizen of the UK. However, the agreements between the UK and Uganda,  Antigua and 
Barbuda,  Barbados,  Venezuela,  Dominican Republic,  Nicaragua,  St Lucia,  Guyana,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Suriname,  
Vietnam,  Libya and Ghana provide that for an offender to be transferred to the UK, such an offender has to be a 
British citizen or has to have close ties with the United Kingdom. For these agreements see (n 4 below). 
4 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Uganda on the Transfer of Convicted Persons (2 June 2009); Agreement between the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ghana 
concerning the Transfer of Prisoners (17 July 2008); Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons (11 February 2010); Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the Transfer of Prisoners (17 
November 2008); Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco on the Transfer of Convicted Offenders (21 February 
2002); Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of Antigua and Barbuda on the Transfer of Prisoners (23 June 2003); Agreement between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Federative 
Republic of Brazil on the Transfer of Prisoners (20 August 1998) Agreement between the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Barbados on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons (3 April 2002); Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Government of the Republic of Cuba on the Transfer of 
Prisoners (13 June 2002); Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Nicaragua on the Transfer of Prisoners (6 September 2005); Agreement 
between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of 
the Government of the Dominican Republic on the Transfer of Prisoners (18 February 2003); Agreement between 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (12 June 2002); Agreement between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
India on the Transfer of Convicted Persons (18 February 2005); Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of St Lucia on the Transfer of Prisoners (27 
April 2006); Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana on the Transfer of Prisoners (5 April 2002); 
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Transfer of Prisoners (24 August 2007); Agreement 
between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of 
the Republic of Peru on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (7 March 2003); Agreement between the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka on the Transfer of Prisoners (6 February 2003); Treaty between the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic on the Transfer 
of Sentenced Persons (7 May 2009); Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (2 January 2012); 
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Republic of Suriname on the Transfer of Prisoners (29 June 2002); and Treaty between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (12 September 2008). Copies of these treaties and their official citation are 
available at <http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/treaties/treaty.htm> accessed 29 December 2013. For a detailed discussion 
of the relevant provisions of these treaties see Jamil D Mujuzi, ‘Analysing the Agreements (Treaties) on the Transfer 
of Sentenced Persons (Offenders/Prisoners) between the United Kingdom and Asian, African and Latin American 
Countries’ (2012) 20 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 377. 
5 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (adopted 21 March 1983, entered into force 1 July 1985) CETS 
No 112. 
6 Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (adopted 19 December 1997, 
entered into force 1 June 2000) CETS No 167. 
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Offenders within the Commonwealth,7 and Council Framework 2008/909/JHA.8 It has enacted 
domestic legislation to give effect to its international obligations on the transfer of offenders.9  
Literature on the issue of offender transfer between the UK and other countries has dealt with 
issues such as the possible rehabilitation of offenders on the one hand, and on the other, victims’ 
rights in the convicting State.10 This article focuses on the role of the courts in the transfer of 
offenders and in particular, the jurisprudence emanating from UK courts on different issues that 
have emerged during the transfer of offenders mostly to the UK. The issues that are dealt with in 
this article include the purpose of the transfers; continued enforcement versus conversion; 
human rights issues; and the relationship between extradition and the transfer of offenders. 
 
2. Purpose of the transfer of a prisoner to the UK 
The difficulties that foreign national offenders face in prisons in many parts of the world are well 
documented.11 According to the German government, these difficulties are the reason why the 
question of prisoner transfer is regularly taken up by nationals of other Member States.12 Some 
of the treaties that the UK has signed up to on this matter stipulate that the purpose of the 
transfer is to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offenders,13 while some refer to facilitating the 
reintegration of the offender.14 Other agreements are silent on the question of the purpose of the 
covered transfers.15 Courts in the UK have had occasions to make observations on the purpose 
of the transfer of offenders from other countries to the UK. The House of Lords has held that: 
‘… the primary policy objective of the United Kingdom statute, which is equally reflected in the 
preamble to the Convention, is the obviously humane and desirable one of enabling persons 
sentenced for crimes committed abroad to serve out their sentences within their own society.’16  
 
                                                          
7 Since 27 June 1991, the UK has been a participant to the Commonwealth Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted 
Offenders. See House of Commons Hansard text of 23 January 2012: Column 92W, available at 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120123/index/120123-x.htm> accessed 29 
December 2013. 
8 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of 
liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union [2008] OJ L 327/27. 
9 Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984. 
10 See generally Dirk van Zyl Smit and John R Spencer, ‘The European Dimension to the Release of Sentenced 
Prisoners’ in Nicola Padfield, Dirk van Zyl Smit and Frieder Dunkel (eds), Release from Prison: European Policy and 
Practice (Willan 2010) 25-26. 
11 See Michal Plachta, Transfer of Prisoners under International Instruments and Domestic Legislation: A Comparative Study 
(Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law 1993) 70-80; Dubinsky, Arnott and Mackenzie (n 
1) 523; Anton M van Kalmthout, Femke Hofstee-Van Der Meulen and Frieder Dunkel (eds), Foreigners in European 
Prisons vol 1 (Wolf Legal Publishers 2007); and Denis Abels, Prisoners of the International Community: The Legal Position of 
Persons Detained at International Criminal Tribunals (Springer 2012) 509-514. 
12 See Case C/302/02 Effing [2005] ECR I-553, para 22. 
13 See agreements between the UK and Saudi Arabia (preamble); Antigua and Barbuda (preamble); Barbados 
(preamble); St Lucia (preamble); Guyana (preamble); Pakistan (preamble); Sri Lanka (preamble); Peru (preamble); 
Cuba (preamble); Egypt (preamble); Venezuela (preamble); Brazil (preamble); Ghana (preamble); Dominican 
Republic (preamble); Nicaragua (preamble); Libya (preamble); and India (preamble) (n 4). 
14 Agreement between the UK and Laos (preamble); Thailand (preamble); Hong Kong (preamble); and Morocco 
(preamble) (n 4). 
15 Agreements between the UK and Rwanda and Uganda (n 4). 
16 Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Read [1989] AC 1014, 1048 [Regina]. 
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In The Queen on the Application of: Steven Willcox v Secretary of State for Justice the Court held that: 
‘[t]he only purpose of the PTA is to enable the prisoner to serve the foreign term at home.’17 It 
has been observed in the context of prisoner transfer in Europe that: 
[W]hile the early Council of Europe instruments in particular were designed to meet 
humanitarian concerns for offenders who were held in countries other than their own 
and were thus less likely to be ‘socially rehabilitated’,  the focus has increasingly shifted to 
the interests of the sentencing states. These states often want troublesome foreign 
offenders to be returned to their home countries, not because the offenders’ interests 
would be better served by being returned, but because the sentencing states want to be 
rid of them to reduce the burden they place on overstretched resources for the 
implementation of sentences.18  
Whether or not English courts are of the view that the offender’s transfer is aimed at his or her 
rehabilitation is not clear in the light of the fact that courts are yet to expressly state that the aim 
of the transfers is to rehabilitate offenders. Courts have emphasised the fact the transfer of an 
offender is done on humanitarian grounds. This could mean many things as case law shows that 
some British prisoners have requested their transfer from countries such as Laos19 and Thailand20 
because of the appalling prison conditions under which they were being detained compared to 
inmates back home. However, once they have been transferred, the question of whether or not 
they have been rehabilitated while serving their sentence in Britain becomes important in 
determining whether or not they will be released early.  
In Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Oshin the court held that: ‘[t]he sentence 
remains the sentence of the foreign sentencing court. Under Article 10, all we are doing is 
continuing it. What happens before transfer happens abroad and is governed by the law of the 
sentencing court.’21 The Court added that: ‘[a]ll we are doing here is enforcing the balance of the 
sentence and it is to this stage and this stage alone that our law applies as Article 9(3) requires.’22  
The reasoning in In re Gilbey23 appears to suggest that even after the transfer the offender’s 
imprisonment in the UK could still be aimed at serving retributive or deterrence purposes of 
punishment.24 The Court held that: ‘[j]udging by the information placed before the court during 
the hearing, retribution and deterrence are important elements in the Thai approach to 
sentencing, and I can find nothing in the 1993 Act which would prevent me from confirming 10 
years as an appropriate punishment part to serve these purposes in this case.’25 One should recall 
that before an offender is transferred from Thailand to serve his sentence in the United 
Kingdom, he or she is required to serve a certain number of years in Thailand.  
It probably would have been more appropriate in this case for the court to consider the number 
of years that the offender had served in Thailand proportionate to the retributive and deterrent 
aims of punishment and then determine the years to be served in Britain for the purposes of 
achieving the rehabilitation objective of punishment. This view is supported by the sentencing 
                                                          
17 The Queen on the Application of: Steven Willcox v Secretary of State for Justice [2009] EWHC 1483 (Admin) para 68 [Willcox 
v Secretary]. 
18 See van Zyl Smit and Spencer (n 10) 43. 
19 Samantha Orobator v Governor of HMP Holloway and Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 58 (Admin) [Orobator]. 
20 Willcox v Secretary [2009] EWHC 1483 (Admin). 
21 Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Oshin [2000] 1 WLR 2311, 2316. 
22 ibid 
23 Re Gilbey [2010] HCJ 4, 2010 SCL 1249. 
24 For a recent detailed discussion of the purposes of punishment, see Gabriel Hallevy, The Right to be Punished – 
Modern Doctrinal Sentencing (Springer 2013) 16-56. 
25 Re Gilbey [2010] HCJ 4, 2010 SCL 1249 para 26. 
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approach of the UK Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Norman Hull v Regina where it was 
stated that: ‘[i]n the United Kingdom the minimum term is a judicially determined period which 
the prisoner is required to serve for retribution and deterrence following which the sole issues 
for determination by the Parole Board are the safety of the public and the reintegration of the 
prisoner upon his release.’26 If this is correct then the reasoning in Regina v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Oshin that emphasis by the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 
on the social rehabilitation of sentenced persons does not in any way impact on the issues of the 
release of the transferred offender27 should not be taken as laying down a general rule. It should 
be understood as limited to the facts in each particular case or to cases with similar facts. The 
observation to be made in light of the foregoing discussion is that although many of the treaties 
between the UK and other countries on the transfer of offenders emphasise rehabilitation as the 
purpose of the transfer, and some emphasise reintegration of the offender courts are yet to hold 
expressly that the purpose of transfer is rehabilitation. This is an issue that courts are called upon 
to address directly. The challenge that the courts are likely to confront is that some treaties in 
this area point to social rehabilitation of the offender as their objective while others refer to 
reintegration and others are completely silent on this issue.  
Although offender rehabilitation and reintegration go hand-in-hand, in the author’s opinion 
there is a difference between the two, however subtle, namely: that rehabilitation is a means to 
reintegration. That is, an offender participates in rehabilitation programmes so that on his release 
he is able to reintegrate into society and reduce the risk of reoffending. The United Nations 
Office of Drugs and Crime considers both rehabilitation and reintegration to be critical in the 
fight against recidivism when it states that ‘the rehabilitation of offenders and their successful 
reintegration into the community [are] basic objectives of the criminal justice process.’28 
However, in the same handbook rehabilitation programmes are given as some of the examples 
of the “social-reintegration programmes.”29 Many scholars distinguish between rehabilitation and 
reintegration30 and courts in different countries also draw a distinction between rehabilitation and 
reintegration.31 
  
                                                          
26 Norman Hull v Regina [2011] EWCA Crim 1261, 2011 WL 1151784, para 28. 
27 Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Oshin [2000] 1 W.L.R. 2311, 2316, 2313. 
28 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Introductory Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of 
Offenders (United Nations 2012) 5. 
29 ibid 6. 
30 See for example, Andrew Day, Tony Ward and Lyn Shirley, ‘Reintegration Services for Long-Term Dangerous 
Offenders: A Case Study and Discussion’ (2011)  50(2) Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 66; Harry R Dammer 
‘Rehabilitation in German Prisons’ (1997) 24 (1-2) Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 1; and Keren Bachia ‘Equine-
Facilitated Prison-Based Programs Within the Context of Prison-Based Animal Programs: State of the Science 
Review’ (2013) 52(1) Journal of Offender Rehabilitation 46-74. 
31 For example, in R v Mosili and Others [2004] LSCA 7 (Judgment of 20 October 2004) [27], the Court of Appeal of 
Lesotho held that ‘[O]ne must guard against the imposition of sentences that are so high as ultimately to leave little 
or no hope for the offender’s rehabilitation and reintegration into society.’ In Uganda v Waiswa & Others [2010] 
UGHC 276 (Judgment of 1 October 2013) the High Court of Uganda held that the purpose of sentencing is 
rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender into society. Justice Yacoob of the South African Constitutional 
Court held in Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and Others; 2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC); 
2009 (6) SA 632 (CC); 2009 (11) BCLR 1105 (CC) [80] that  ‘...the possibilities of the rehabilitation of children and 
their reintegration into society must always be carefully considered by a sentencing court.’ In Bandisa v S (A83/2010) 
[2010] ZAWCHC 430 (28 July 2010) the High Court of South Africa, in sentencing the offender to 10 years’ 
imprisonment and suspending half of the sentence to deter him from reoffending, held that the sentence it imposed 
will ensure the rehabilitation of the appellant and his reintegration into his community and family. In V v The United 
Kingdom (Application No 24888/94) Grand Chamber (Judgment of 16 December 1999) in his concurring opinion 
Lord Reed stated that  ‘On the one hand, the importance attached to safeguarding the well-being and future of 
young children who have offended, and promoting their rehabilitation and reintegration into society, point towards 
holding their trials in private.’  
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3. Continued enforcement versus conversion 
One of the most hotly debated issues that courts have dealt with is that of whether UK courts 
have the power to convert the sentences of offenders transferred from other countries. At the 
time of time of ratifying the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, the UK made a 
declaration to the effect that it would not convert sentences for offenders transferred to the 
UK.32 The Repatriation of Prisoners Act does not provide for the conversion of sentences.33 The 
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons provides for both continued enforcement 
(under Article 10) and conversion (under Article 11). At the time of ratifying the Convention on 
the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, some countries indicated that they would only allow transfers 
to their territory in cases where they would be able to convert the sentence in question.34 Other 
States indicated that they would only allow transfer to their territory to ensure enforcement of 
the remaining sentence,35 yet others expressly or impliedly allow both conversion and continued 
enforcement.36  
State practice shows that some countries are loathe to transfer offenders to destinations where 
conversion as opposed to continued enforcement of the transferred sentence was practised.37 In 
1988 the House of Lords made it very clear that continued enforcement and conversion are 
‘[t]wo radically different procedures’38 and that ‘[t]he nature and duration of any sentence…to be 
served in the United Kingdom as the administering state by a prisoner transferred here under the 
Convention is governed by the procedure for continued enforcement…to the exclusion of the 
procedure for conversion of sentence…’39 In support of the continued enforcement of 
transferred sentences, the court in In re Gilbey40 where the applicant had challenged the continued 
enforcement in Scotland of a life sentence that had been imposed on him in Thailand before his 
transfer, the Court held that: 
[I]t must be remembered that the international arrangements which apply in cases such 
as the present reflect a commitment to mutual respect and recognition between or 
                                                          
32 It is reported that ‘Declaration contained in a letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, 
dated 30 April 1985, handed to the Secretary General at the time of deposit of the instrument of ratification, on 30 
April 1985 [stated that]: The United Kingdom intends to exclude the application of the procedure provided for in 
Article 9(1)(b) in cases when the United Kingdom is the administering State.’ See List of declarations made with 
respect to treaty No 112 at 
www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=112&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG&VL=1 
 accessed 29 December 2013. 
33 See Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984, Chapter 47, section 3. 
34 These countries are: Georgia and Russia. 
35 These countries are: France, United Kingdom, Andorra, Bahamas, Belgium, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, 
Spain, Italy, Malta, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. 
36 For example, Greece and San Marino. 
37 Plepi v Albania and Greece (2010) 51 EHRR 3 the applicant was convicted and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment 
for, inter alia, drug trafficking. The Greek court found that the applicants should serve their sentence in Albania 
because ‘it considered that the sentences imposed by the Greek court were compatible with Albanian criminal 
law…’ However, later ‘…the Albanian Ministry of Justice informed its Greek counterparts that there existed the 
possibility of conditional release for the applicants after serving half of their sentence, provided that they had 
displayed good behaviour in prison. Consequently… the Greek Ministry of Justice informed the applicants and the 
Albanian Ministry of Justice of its refusal to transfer the applicants on the ground that the sentences commuted by 
the Albanian court were inferior to those imposed by the Greek court and thus incompatible with the gravity of 
their offence and with the short time they had spent in Greek prisons.’ See ibid 48. See also Willcox v Secretary [2009] 
EWHC 1483 (Admin) para 87 in which the court states that Thailand refused to sign a prisoner transfer agreement 
with the Netherlands because the latter has insisted on the possibility of being able to convert the sentences of its 
nationals transferred from Thailand. 
38 Regina [1989] AC 1014, 1048. 
39 ibid 1049. 
40 Re Gilbey [2010] HCJ 4, 2010 SCL 1249. 
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among the governments and legal systems of participating states. Maintaining such 
laudable objectives is of practical significance, not merely to the states concerned, but 
also to those individuals who might benefit from appropriate repatriation arrangements. 
From their point of view, any state conduct failing to reflect the necessary levels of 
respect and recognition may carry a serious risk of international cooperation being 
reduced or even withdrawn, and if any such risk were to materialise prisoners such as Mr 
Gilbey might be very much worse off than they are now. Against that background I 
would not, for my part, be prepared to fix a punishment part of a length which might, in 
Thailand, be regarded as derisory by comparison with the long term ineligibility for 
parole which characterised the sentence actually imposed.41 
With the exception of a few cases that will be dealt with shortly, courts in the UK have 
maintained the position that if an offender is transferred to the UK, the UK will continue to 
enforce the sentence that has been imposed by the courts of the sentencing State unless such a 
sentence exceeds the maximum sentence that a UK Court would have imposed in terms of the 
UK legislation. In such a case, ‘the Secretary of State adapting the sentence under Article 10 of 
the Convention has power to reduce the sentence to that maximum but no further…’42 Although 
that decision has been in place since 1988, there have been cases where courts have converted 
the transferred sentences.  
In In the Matter of Abdur Rashid Khan43 in which the offender was sentenced to life imprisonment 
by a Canadian court and transferred to serve his sentence in the UK, the court, after discussing 
the distinction between conversation and continued enforcement in terms of the Convention on 
the Transfer of Sentenced Persons held that: ‘this country is bound by the legal nature and 
duration of the original sentence.’44 The court emphasised that the offender had been sentenced 
to life imprisonment but held that there were mitigating factors45 and concluded that the 
minimum sentence to be served by the appellant was 10 years’ imprisonment.46  
In Norman Hull v Regina,47 the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life 
imprisonment in the Republic of Ireland. He was transferred to the UK to serve his sentence. In 
emphasising the fact that the High Court had erred when it converted the applicant’s sentence,48 
the Court held that he was to be ‘treated as if he had been sentenced to a term of life 
imprisonment fixed by a court in England and Wales.’49 The court added that ‘a mandatory life 
sentence has the same legal nature in Ireland and in the United Kingdom only to the extent that 
each is a sentence of imprisonment.’50 Most importantly, the Court held that:  
[I]t would appear that [the judge In the Matter of Abdur Rashid Khan] was [not] informed of 
the declaration made by the United Kingdom Government at the time of ratification of 
the transferred prisoners’ Convention …[and] proceeded upon the mistaken assumption 
that he was involved in a process of conversion of the sentence.51 
                                                          
41 ibid para 25(xi). 
42 Regina [1989] AC 1014, 1053. 
43 Re Abdur Rashid Khan [2006] EWHC 2826 (QB). 
44 ibid para 15. 
45 ibid para16. 
46 ibid para 17. 
47 Norman Hull v Regina [2011] EWCA Crim 1261, 2011 WL 1151784. 
48 ibid paras 45-46. 
49 ibid para 39. 
50 ibid para 47. 
51 ibid para 41. 
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As mentioned above, the Court in Abdur Rashid Khan was fully aware that the UK was bound by 
the legal nature and duration of the sentence in question but chose to convert a life sentence to 
10 years’ imprisonment. Whether or not the Court’s decision to convert the sentence was 
attributable to the fact that it was not aware that the UK had made a declaration at the time of 
ratification excluding the option of converting transferred sentences is unclear. In all the 
agreements on the transfer of offenders that the UK has entered with other countries it has 
excluded the possibility of converting sentences of convicting States.52 While dealing with the 
issue of whether UK courts were empowered to convert the sentence of an offender transferred 
from Thailand, the High Court, in The Queen on the Application of: Steven Willcox v Secretary of State for 
Justice held that: ‘it is plain on the wording of the PTA that under it, the United Kingdom, has no 
power to convert a sentence so as to make it a sentence of the kind the United Kingdom courts 
might have imposed for the offence (and offender) in question.’53 
The case of Samantha Orobator v Governor of HMP Holloway and Secretary of State for Justice54 raises an 
interesting point. The complainant was a “transferred life prisoner”’ from Laos to the UK.55 The 
High Court rejected her argument that her trial in Laos had been a flagrant denial of justice and 
therefore her continued detention in the UK had violated her right to liberty in terms of Article 5 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, applying the British law on the release 
of offenders,56 the High Court found that there were mitigating circumstances in favour of the 
applicant57 and held that the ‘appropriate determinate sentence’ was 3 years’ imprisonment and 
that in terms of the English law if she ‘had been sentenced to a term of 3 years, she would have 
been released on licence after serving one-half of her sentence.’58 The Court reduced her 
sentence to a minimum of 18 months’ imprisonment.59 As the Court observed: 
The claimant agreed to be transferred to the UK to serve the remainder of her sentence 
pursuant to the Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 
(“the Prisoner Transfer Agreement” or “PTA”). The PTA did not come into force until 
25 September 2009. But the UK and Laos signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 
28 July 2009 that both states would immediately apply the full provisions of the PTA 
administratively. She was transferred from Laos to the UK on 7 August 2009 and has 
been detained in HMP Holloway ever since.60 
As mentioned earlier, the agreement between Laos and the UK provides for continued 
enforcement as opposed to conversion.61 As mentioned earlier, the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 
does not include conversion and the House of Lords held as early as 1988 that the Repatriation 
of Prisoners Act provided for continued enforcement at the exclusion of conversion. However, 
as indicated earlier, in this case the Court converted the sentence from one of life imprisonment 
to three years’ imprisonment.  
                                                          
52 See agreements between the UK and Saudi Arabia (art 7); Laos (art 8); St Lucia (art 8); Nicaragua (art 8); 
Dominican Republic (art 8); Suriname (arts 7 and 8); Guyana (arts 7 and 8); Vietnam (art 9); Pakistan (art 9); India 
(art 8); Sri Lanka (art 10); Antigua and Barbuda (art 8);  Peru (art 8(2)); Cuba (art 9(2)); Venezuela (art 8.2); Barbados 
(art 8); Brazil (art 7 and 8); Egypt (art 10 and 11); Thailand (art 6); Hong Kong (art 6); Morocco (art 13); Ghana (art 
7); Rwanda (art 7); Libya (art 7); and Uganda (art 7) (n 4).  
53 Willcox v Secretary [2009] EWHC 1483 (Admin) para 86. 
54 Orobator [2010] EWHC 58 (Admin). 
55 ibid para 125. 
56 ibid paras 125-129. 
57 ibid paras 131-137. 
58 ibid para 138. 
59 ibid paras 138-139. 
60 ibid para 3. 
61 Agreement between the UK and Laos art 8. 
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In refusing to follow the reasoning in Orabator the Court re Gilbey62 observed that: ‘the court had 
apparently proceeded on a straightforward application of domestic legislation, and without any 
discussion of the regime under the 1984 Act and relative Convention as authoritatively 
interpreted by the House of Lords in Read’ and that the House of Lords decision in Read ‘was, 
however, briefly mentioned for other purposes.’63 It should be recalled that Ms Orobator had not 
been transferred on the basis of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. Rather 
she had been transferred on the basis of the PTA between Laos and the UK. However, the point 
to be emphasised is the following, namely, that had the court in Orobator referred to the House of 
Lords decision in question and to section 3 of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act in particular 
when it had dealt with the issue of ‘tariff’, it would probably have come to a different conclusion. 
Although the court in Orobator specifically referred to Article 8 of the PTA between the UK and 
Laos,64 it nevertheless came to the conclusion that it could convert the sentence on the basis of 
UK law. On the basis of the above discussion, one can confidently conclude that the correct 
position in the UK is that of continued enforcement as opposed to conversion. This is evident 
from the treaties that the UK has signed with other countries. Moreover, it is also evident from 
Section 3 of the Repatriation of Prisoners’ Act, in the UK’s reservation to the Convention on the 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons and in the majority judgements handed down by courts including 
the House of Lords. 
 
4. Human rights 
One of the most important issues in the context of the transfer of sentenced persons is the rights 
of the offender in question. Before I embark on the discussion of some of the rights that have 
been dealt with by courts in the UK in the context of prisoner transfer, it is critical to deal with 
the issue of how courts have dealt with the issue of the offender’s right to be transferred. None 
of the agreements in the UK and other countries stipulate that an offender has a right to be 
transferred.65 Even the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons does not contain a 
provision to the effect that an offender has a right to be transferred. Two potentially 
irreconcilable approaches have been taken by the UK courts on the issue of the offender’s right 
to be transferred. In the first category one finds cases in which it has been held that the treaty 
does not provide an individual right to to be transferred. For example, in McKinnon v Government 
of the United States of America and another66 the House of Lords held that: ‘the Convention [on the 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons] confers no rights on prisoners: a state is not obliged to comply 
with a repatriation request nor to provide reasons if it refuses to do so.’67 Similarly, the European 
                                                          
62 Re Gilbey [2010] HCJ 4, 2010 SCL 1249. 
63 ibid para 14. See also ibid para 25(x). 
64 Orobator paras 17-18. 
65 Although art 8(1) of the agreement between the UK and Uganda states that the offender has a right to ‘express to 
either the transferring State or the receiving State an interest in being transferred under this Agreement.’ See also 
common art 8(1) of the agreements between the UK and Rwanda and Saudi Arabia (n 4). 
66 McKinnon v Government of the United States of America and another [2008] UKHL 59 [McKinnon]. 
67 ibid para 36. The High Court had observed in Gary McKinnon v Government of the USA, Secretary of State for the Home 
Dept [2007] EWHC 762 (Admin), in which the representatives of the government of the United States of America 
had issued a veiled threat against the applicant that if he had refused to enter into a plea agreement with the 
prosecutors they would oppose his application for the transfer to the UK to serve his sentence, that ‘Among other 
things, the evidence points to some unusual features in the particular proposed Plea Agreement and to the opinion 
that support from the prosecuting authorities is the single most important factor in deciding applications for 
repatriation. Where a transfer is refused by the Department of Justice, the decision is unreviewable in the American 
courts. Moreover the reasons for the refusal are exempt from disclosure.’ See para 52. 
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Court of Human Rights also held that the offender had no right to be transferred from Greece 
to serve his sentence in Albania.68  
 
In the second category one finds the case of The Queen on the Application of Henry Max Shaheen v 
The Secretary of State for Justice in which the High Court held that: “   the Convention gives the 
sentencing State an unqualified discretion to grant or withhold its consent to a transfer. The only 
constraints on the exercise of the discretion by the Secretary of State are that his decision must 
not be in breach of the Human Rights Act, or be unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense”.69 
Unlike the House of Lords which held that a state is not obliged to transfer the offender and also 
to give the reasons for the refusal to transfer, the High Court recognises that the UK still has 
discretion to refuse to transfer an offender but that such a discretion has to be exercised in line 
with the relevant laws. Of the two approaches, the current author is of the view that the High 
Court decision is more progressive than the House of Lords one. This is because in deciding 
whether or not to transfer an offender, the Secretary of State has to have reasons that form the 
basis of that decision. In this sense the offender would clearly possess an implied right to access 
information, especially information that might affect his dignity negatively, thereby imposing 
upon the Secretary of State a duty to execute his or her duties reasonably. Where the reasons that 
have been invoked to refuse the offender’s application for a transfer are unreasonable, courts 
should be able to set aside a decision based on unreasonableness.  
In The Queen on the Application of Henry Max Shaheen v The Secretary of State for Justice the applicant 
was a British national who was domiciled in The Netherlands from where he had committed 
offences in the UK. He wanted to be transferred to The Netherlands to serve the remainder of 
his sentence in that country close to his family. The Secretary of State refused to allow his 
transfer on the ground that he was likely to be released early in The Netherlands and he would 
have come back to the UK a free man when in fact he should have been in prison had he served 
his sentence in the UK. The Court held that the refusal to transfer the applicant to The 
Netherlands was not unreasonable.   
It should be noted that although the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons and 
indeed most of the treaties that the UK has signed with other countries do not expressly confer 
rights on prisoners, they include provisions that, if not complied with, could potentially be 
challenged on purely human rights grounds. For example, Article 4(1) of the Convention on the 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons states that: ‘[a]ny sentenced person to whom this Convention 
may apply shall be informed by the sentencing State of the substance of this Convention.’ A 
provision to the same effect is also found in the agreements that the UK has signed with other 
countries. In the agreement on the transfer of offenders between the UK and Rwanda, between 
the UK and Saudi Arabia and between the UK and Uganda, it is clearly stated that one of the 
rights of the offender is to be informed by the transferring state of the substance of the transfer 
agreement.70  
In practice this has happened to all the offenders transferred to the UK.71 If such an offender 
were not informed of the substance of the treaty before the transfer, he could argue that his 
transfer was not based on his consent. This has happened in countries such as Hong Kong 
                                                          
68 In Plepi v Albania and Greece the Court held that 'there is no evidence that Greek law confers on the applicants any 
right to be transferred to Albania and the applicants did not refer to any relevant legal provisions which would 
indicate the existence of such a right.' Plepi v Albania and Greece (n 37) 53. 
69 The Queen on the Application of Henry Max Shaheen v The Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWHC 1195 (Admin), para 
28 [Shaheen]. For the test see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
70 Agreement between the UK and Rwanda, and agreement between the UK and Saudi Arabia common art 8(2) (n 
4). 
71 For example, see Re Abdur Rashid Khan [2006] EWHC 2826 (QB) para 9. 
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where transferred offenders have argued, though unsuccessfully, that the information provided 
to them before the transfers was misleading and that there transfers took place without their 
consent.72 Although what is not clear is whether such an offender could be returned to the 
sentencing sentence should courts in the UK reach the conclusion that indeed prior to his 
transfer he was not informed of the substance of the treaty or properly informed of the 
substance of the treaty.  
There has been a move towards including implied or express human rights provisions in prisoner 
transfer treaties. For example, some of the treaties that the UK has signed with other countries 
provide that the transferred offender’s right against double jeopardy shall be protected. For 
example, the treaty between the UK and Antigua and Barbuda provides that: ‘[a] prisoner who 
has been transferred under this Agreement shall not be arrested, put on trial or sentenced by the 
receiving state for the same offence for which he was sentenced in the sentencing state.’73 The 
preamble to the treaties between the UK and Uganda and the UK and Rwanda on the transfer of 
offenders provides that both parties reaffirm ‘that sentenced persons shall be treated with 
respect for their human rights.’ Article 9 of the agreement between the UK and Uganda 
specifically provides that: 
Each Party shall treat all sentenced persons transferred under this Agreement in accordance 
with their applicable international human rights obligations, particularly regarding the right to 
life and the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
A provision to the same effect is also to be found in the treaty between the UK and Rwanda.74 
The agreement between the UK and Rwanda also provides for limited circumstances in which 
the administering state is allowed to limit the personal freedom of the transferred offender.75 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA,76 which has recently been relied upon by the Supreme 
Court of the UK,77 expressly provides that: 
This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Chapter VI thereof. Nothing 
in this Framework Decision should be interpreted as prohibiting refusal to execute a 
decision when there are objective reasons to believe that the sentence was imposed for 
the purpose of punishing a person on the grounds of his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic 
origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation, or that that person’s 
position may be prejudiced on any one of those grounds.78 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA also imposes an obligation on EU member states to 
respect rights such as freedom of movement79 and other fundamental rights.80 Once the offender 
has been transferred to the UK, he or she is protected under UK legislation and in particular the 
Human Rights Act, 1998 and UK’s international human rights obligations. It should be recalled 
                                                          
72 See for example Lai Hin Cheong v Long-Term Prison Sentences Review Board 2008 WL 4262510 (CFI), [2008] HKEC 
1701; and Ng King Tat Philip v Post Release Supervision Board 2010 WL 2214275 (CFI), [2010] HKEC 1306. 
73 Art 8(1). See also art 14(1) of agreement with Morocco (n 4). 
74 Agreement between the UK and Rwanda art 9 (n 4). 
75 Art 10(1). 
76 Council Framework Decision (n 8) 27. 
77 HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa; PH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa; F-K v Polish 
Judicial Authority [2012] UKSC 25, (2012) HRLR 25, para 105. 
78 Preamble para 13. 
79 Preamble para 15. 
80 Art 3(4). 
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that the Human Rights Act has no extraterritorial application.81 This means that UK citizens 
imprisoned abroad are not protected by UK human rights law. 
 
4.1. The right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment 
The right to freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is provided 
for in the UK Human Rights Act which transforms the European Convention on Human Rights 
into national law.82 Further, the UK is also party to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights83 and to UN Convention against Torture84 which both guarantee this freedom 
through relevant provisions. Moreover, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte No. 385    is clear that the 
prohibition against torture has achieved the status of jus cogens, that is a norm of supreme 
recognition and importance for the international legal system.  
The UK also has an obligation to prevent torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment as a consequence of its recognition of the jurisdiction of UN human rights bodies 
and the European Court of Human Rights. These entities have developed enormously rich 
jurisprudence on the recognition, promotion and protection of the right to freedom from torture 
or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, especially in the context of deportation and 
expulsion of non-nationals.86 The question of the relationship between the enforcement of a 
transferred sentence and the right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment has emerged in cases where offenders have been transferred to serve their sentences 
in the UK.  
In Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department87 the applicant was sentenced to 12 years’ 
imprisonment and one day in Spain for introducing counterfeit currency. The Spanish court, 
when imposing sentence had stated that it would recommend to the government for the 
applicant’s sentence to be reduced to six years’ imprisonment and one day. Before the sentence 
was reduced the applicant was transferred to the UK to serve his sentence and because the UK 
did not convert the applicant’s sentence, the adopted sentence was 10 years’ imprisonment. The 
applicant argued, and the Court agreed with him, that had he been sentenced in the UK for a 
similar offence, he would have been sentenced to between four and five years’ imprisonment. He 
argued, inter alia, that ‘a term of 10 years for the particular offence was wholly disproportionate 
to the gravity of the offence and constituted a cruel or unusual punishment contrary to the Bill 
of Rights 1688.’88 In dismissing the applicant’s argument, the Court held that: 
[T]his punishment is and remains a punishment imposed by a Spanish court, not subject 
to the Bill of Rights 1688, and, secondly, the punishment after adaptation comes within 
                                                          
81 See R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] UKSC 29. 
82 David Feldman (ed), Oxford Principles of English Law: English Public Law (2nd edition, OUP 2009) 390-97. 
83 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 7. 
84 See UN Committee Against Torture, ‘General Comment No 2’ (24 January 2008) CAT/C/GC/2. 
85 Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 A.C. 147. 
86 See David Weissbrodt and Isabel Hörtreiter, ‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison With the Non-
Refoulement Provisions of Other International Human Rights Treaties’ (1999) 5 Buffalo Human Rights Law 
Review 1. 
87 Regina v Secretary of State For The Home Department [1988] 2 WLR 236. 
88 ibid 241. 
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the statutory maximum laid down by Parliament in respect of this type of offence, so it 
cannot in English law be regarded as cruel and unusual.89 
In the above ruling two points are made by the Court. Firstly, because of the fact that the 
punishment had been determined and imposed by a Spanish court, it could not thereafter be 
subjected to the Bill of Rights, 1688. Secondly, because similar punishment is allowed by a piece 
of legislation passed by the UK Parliament, it cannot be regarded as cruel and unusual. One has 
to recall that the Bill of Rights of 1688 prohibited the imposition of cruel and unusual 
punishment.90 Technically speaking, the punishment in question had been imposed by a Spanish 
court but there was room for arguing that although the initial punishment had been imposed by 
a Spanish court, the adopted sentence had been arrived at as a result of an act of the Secretary of 
State and therefore could be challenged as an unusual punishment. But in the light of the 
enactment by the UK Parliament in 1998 of the Human Rights Act, the correctness or otherwise 
of that argument or the Court’s reasoning is now moot.  
The Court’s reasoning that the fact that the sentence in question was consistent with an Act of 
Parliament meant that it could not be cruel and unusual should also be understood against the 
background that the decision was handed down 10 years before the Human Rights Act was 
enacted. However, in the light of the jurisprudence emanating from the European Court of 
Human Rights and from relevant international human rights treaty bodies such as the Human 
Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture, specifically on the question that the right 
not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment is an absolute right, such a conclusion 
cannot be sustained today.  
On appeal to the House of Lords in Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte 
Read91 the prisoner’s lawyer argued, inter alia, that: 
[A]rticle 10 [of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons] must be read in 
the context of all the relevant provisions of the Convention, including article 9.1 and 
article 11; the context also includes the other multilateral conventions by which the 
Council of Europe member states are bound (as paragraph 3 of the explanatory report 
recognises), and in particular, the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms , since plainly the drafters of the Convention did not 
intend to authorise or require the enforcement of foreign sentences in a manner which 
would breach article 3 of the European Human Rights Convention (as interpreted by the 
European Court of Human Rights...92 
The respondent argued that ‘the Bill of Rights is itself a statute with at least equivalent status to 
any other statute, and the compatibility of any sentence with the law of England has therefore to 
be judged in the light of the statutory prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments’.93 The 
House of Lords held that: 
The international arrangement under which the present prisoner’s transfer from Spain to 
the United Kingdom was effected are contained in the Convention on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons 1983 …, and it is on the provisions of the Convention that the 
outcome of this appeal turns. But it may be important to bear in mind, in considering the 
effect of those provisions, that the primary policy objective of the United Kingdom 
statute, which is equally reflected in the preamble to the Convention, is the obviously 
                                                          
89 ibid 247. 
90 For the drafting history of the Bill of Rights of 1688 see Feldman (n 82) 41-42. 
91 Regina [1989] AC 1014. 
92 ibid 1038. 
93 ibid 1039. 
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humane and desirable one of enabling persons sentenced for crimes committed abroad 
to serve out their sentences within their own society, which, irrespective of the length of 
sentence, will almost always mitigate the rigour of the punishment inflicted.94 
There is no doubt that the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons and  the national 
legislation in the UK indeed aim at ensuring that prisoners are transferred to serve their 
sentences in the UK and that if such a transfer is successful, they will not face the well-known 
problems that foreign national offenders face in prisons. However, the House of Lords’ ruling 
above does not directly address the question of whether there could be circumstances in which 
the offender’s transferred sentence might be regarded as cruel and inhumane. It has been argued 
that ‘[i]t is a recognised principle of justice that penalties should not be excessive, as 
acknowledged in the Bill of Rights of 1689.’95  
The question of whether an excessive transferred sentence violated Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights was raised in The Queen on the Application of: Steven Willcox v Secretary 
of State for Justice.96 The prisoner had been transferred from Thailand where he had been 
sentenced to 33 years and six months’ imprisonment for possessing a small amount of drugs. 
After his transfer to England his sentence was reduced by the Thai authorities to 29 years and 
three months’ imprisonment. If he had been convicted for a similar offence in England he would 
have been sentenced to between four and five years. His lawyer argued that ‘the Thai sentence 
here is four to five times as great as that which would be imposed by the UK, and that such a 
disproportion is so gross as to amount to a breach of Article 3.’97  
The Court stated that: ‘there is no ECtHR decision that a determinate sentence imposed by a 
contracting or non-contracting state breached Article 3 simply because it was grossly 
disproportionate by virtue of its length,’ and that: ‘a sentence imposed by a contracting state 
could amount to a breach of Article 3, for example where a life sentence was imposed on a 
juvenile, or a life sentence from which there was no chance of release before death whatever the 
circumstances’.98 The Court added that: 
The circumstances will be rare…in which the length of a transferred sentence by itself 
could give rise to a problem of such gross disproportion as to amount to a breach of 
Article 3, because the UK maximum for the equivalent offence applies to limit the extent 
of the term to be served whatever the sentence imposed in the transferring country. It 
does not seem…of any value to consider whether a determinate sentence is or may be so 
grossly disproportionate as to breach Article 3 simply by virtue of its length. That is 
because there will always be other factors present to affect the judgment. These will 
include the nature of the offence, the rationale for the sentencing framework, as well as 
the specific way in which the offence was committed, and the personal circumstances of 
the offender.99 
The Court concluded that: 
[T]he question of whether Article 3 creates absolute standards, or whether actions which 
would breach Article 3 if done by the UK might not do so if done by another state, is a lively 
one … The question is always whether the act done by the UK breaches Article 3, rather 
than whether the act of the foreign state did or would. If the act of the foreign state itself 
                                                          
94 ibid 1048. 
95 Feldman (n 82) 726, para 16.22. 
96 Willcox v Secretary [2009] EWHC 1483 (Admin). 
97 ibid para 57. 
98 ibid para 59. 
99 ibid para 60. 
J.D. Mujuzi UK Practice on transfer of sentenced offendersSPILJ Vol.1 No.1 (2014) 73-96 
State Practice & International Law Journal Vol.1 No.1 (2014) Page 87 
 
would not breach Article 3, the answer in relation to the UK is of course anyway clear. I take 
the view that, if the act of the foreign state however did or would breach Article 3 were it a 
state party to the ECHR, the UK may or may not breach Article 3 in the way its own act 
relates to it, depending on the nature of and justification for the acts and how the two acts 
inter-relate. Transferring a prisoner into the UK at his request to serve a term which he 
would otherwise have to serve abroad, and which would breach Article 3 if imposed here, is 
not the same nature or quality of act as sentencing someone in that way in the first place nor 
the same as removing someone to serve a such a sentence abroad. There may be differences 
depending on what gives rise to the asserted cruelty, inhumanity or degradation. I am 
prepared again to assume that the UK would breach Article 3 were it to impose the same 
sentence in the same circumstances. But it would be quite unreal to approach the question of 
whether continued enforcement on transfer into the UK would breach Article 3 on that 
basis. That is simply not the context in which the issue arises.100 
The above ruling shows that courts in the UK are increasingly paying attention to the human 
rights implications of adopted sentences. This is attributable to the increasing human rights 
obligations in terms of the Human Rights Act also in terms of the UK’s obligations in 
international law especially in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights. It has been 
argued that: ‘[a]t the most fundamental level, sentences created by Parliament or imposed by the 
courts must not infringe Article 3 of the ECHR…’.101 It is argued that in the light of the absolute 
prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the European Convention 
on Human Rights (as incorporated by the Human Rights Act), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture, courts can invoke a human rights 
approach to ensure that the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons is not understood 
as permitting the enforcement of excessive sentences.  
In this author’s view, the offender’s right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment has to be protected in all circumstances irrespective of whether or not s/he is a 
transferred offender. His/her right not to be subjected to such treatment or punishment is 
independent of the policy considerations that the executive might want to achieve in ensuring 
that as many people as possible are transferred to serve their sentences in the UK. Politicians in 
the UK have also realised that offenders transferred from Thailand serve lengthy prison terms 
for relatively minor offences and have called upon the UK government to have negotiations with 
the Thai authorities and have the transfer agreement amended to resolve that issue.102 
 
4.2. The right to family life 
It should be recalled, as mentioned earlier, that both the House of Lords and the European 
Court of Human Rights have expressly held that the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons does not confer any specific rights on the offender. Jurisprudence emanating from 
courts in the UK shows that one of the issues that have arisen in the context of prisoner transfer 
                                                          
100 ibid para 78. 
101 Feldman (n 82) 1193, para 28.05. 
102 See House of Lords, Hansard text of 23 May 2012: Column WA80 where Lord Avebury asked ‘her Majesty’s 
Government what progress they have made in including provision for reduced sentences for prisoners transferred to 
the United Kingdom in a renegotiated prisoner transfer agreement with Thailand; and whether they will ensure that 
the new agreement will apply to prisoners already transferred.’ The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice Lord 
McNally, replied that the ‘[p]roposed amendments to the prisoner transfer agreement with Thailand have been 
presented to the Thai authorities for their consideration. We have not yet had a response to these proposals. Any 
changes to the prisoner transfer agreement will require the consent of the Thai authorities. The position of those 
prisoners already transferred to the UK will be considered in any future negotiations.’  
J.D. Mujuzi UK Practice on transfer of sentenced offendersSPILJ Vol.1 No.1 (2014) 73-96 
State Practice & International Law Journal Vol.1 No.1 (2014) Page 88 
 
is the right to family life. As Easton observes, ‘[t]he right to family life has arisen in relation to a 
range of issues in prison including allocation, temporary releases, visits and the right to marry 
and have children.’103 This right is provided for under the European Convention on Human 
Rights,104 and also in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.105 One has to 
remember that the right to family life has been a contentions right in cases of deportation or 
expulsion of foreign nationals from the UK.106 In the context of prisoner transfer, courts have 
held that the possibility of the offender being transferred back to the UK to serve his sentence 
could enable him to enjoy his right to family life.107 A court will not order the UK authorities to 
transfer an offender to serve his/her sentence in his/her country of domicile simply because 
his/her continued imprisonment in the UK leads to a violation of his/her right to a family life.  
In The Queen on the Application of Henry Max Shaheen v The Secretary of State for Justice108 the applicant, 
a British citizen, who lived in The Netherlands with his wife and children, was convicted of drug 
trafficking and sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment in the UK. Before his conviction he had 
lived in The Netherlands for 15 years. The applicant requested to be transferred to The 
Netherlands to serve his sentence and the Dutch authorities wrote to the UK authorities ‘saying 
that they were willing to accept the claimant on transfer, and that they intended to convert the 
sentence under Dutch law upon transfer.’109  
The Secretary of State refused the applicant’s request for the transfer on the ground that he 
would have his sentence significantly reduced by the Dutch authorities and could not be refused 
to enter the UK even if he chose to come back at a time when he should have been in prison 
had he served his sentence in the UK. The Secretary of State stated that:  ‘[i]n reaching his 
decision to refuse [the applicant’s] application [he] gave full consideration to [the applicant’s] 
family and residency links with The Netherlands but concluded that [his] right to return to the 
UK at any time following his release from custody in The Netherlands outweighed these 
considerations.’110  
The applicant’s lawyer argued that: ‘the maintenance of family contacts is an essential aim of the 
prison system’ and that his imprisonment in the UK meant that he had very limited time to see 
his wife and children every year when they visited him and that refusing his request to be 
transferred to The Netherlands meant that ‘he will be unable to lead any semblance of normal 
family life for the next 5–8 years.’111 The Court held that the Secretary of State was justified in 
refusing the applicant’s request to the transfer because of, inter alia, the fact that there was a risk 
that he could re-offend in the UK. The Court concluded that: 
In assessing the proportionality of the decision, I have considered the extent of the 
interference with the claimant’s right to respect for his family life that will result from the 
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refusal to consent to the transfer. I fully accept that serving prisoners have Article 8 
rights. But their rights to see members of their families are inevitably and seriously 
curtailed simply by virtue of their being deprived of their liberty. A decision not to 
transfer a prisoner to a prison where he will be nearer to his family must be viewed in 
that light. Even if a prisoner is transferred to a prison closer to his family, he will 
inevitably only have exiguous rights to see them.112  
The Court rightly concludes that prisoners have a right to family life but that this right is not 
absolute. One should not lose sight of the fact that the main reason why the Secretary of State 
refused to transfer the applicant to The Netherlands is that his sentence could be converted by 
the Dutch authorities resulting in his early release and then possibly, returning to the UK a free 
man at a time he should have been in prison had he served his sentence in the UK. Had the 
applicant been a foreign national, like his co-accused, his transfer request would have probably 
been allowed because of the fact the UK would have barred him from returning to the UK for a 
certain period of time. This case demonstrates that although the right to a family life is 
important, it is just one of the factors that have to be considered in determining whether or not a 
transfer request should be allowed. As the Court rightly observed, ‘neither the Convention nor 
the 1984 Act gives any guidance as to what the Secretary of State should take into account in 
determining whether or not to consent to a transfer of a prisoner.’113 
 
4.3. The right to a fair trial and continued detention in the UK 
The right to a fair trial is guaranteed in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights114 and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.115 In Drozd and Janousek 
v France and Spain,116 the European Court of Human Rights held that: ‘[t]he Contracting States 
are… obliged to refuse their co-operation [in enforcing a sentence] if it emerges that the 
conviction is the result of a flagrant denial of justice.’117 Although that was a decision of the 
ECtHR, the impact of the jurisprudence of that court on the UK courts’ human rights 
jurisprudence has been steadily increasing.118  
Since the Drozd and Janousek decision, many transferred offenders have sought to challenge their 
continued imprisonment in the UK as a violation of their right to liberty on the basis that the 
criminal proceedings leading to their convictions were unfair. The transferred offenders have 
largely not succeeded in convincing courts that indeed their trials amounted to a flagrant denial 
of justice. In The Queen on the Application of: Steven Willcox v Secretary of State for Justice the applicant 
argued, inter alia, that his trial had been a flagrant denial of justice because Thai law created an 
irrebuttable presumption of guilt with respect to the offence of which the prisoner had been 
convicted and that the prisoner had not been represented at sentencing. The Court held that: 
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[T]here comes a point at which the UK authorities must decline to exercise the power to 
make a request under the PTA for the transfer of someone who on the face of it falls 
within its terms, because in reality the sentence is not the sentence of a competent court. 
The UK could not continue to enforce it in the UK nor, conformably with the ECHR, 
lawfully hold the individual in detention. It could not dignify the foreign process as a 
conviction or consequential sentence by a competent court. An example would be a 
sentence following a show trial, albeit for what on its face could be a conventional 
criminal offence, but with the result pre-determined by political intervention. It is 
necessary for the UK as receiving state to ask before transfer whether there was, in 
substance as well as in form, a conviction before a competent criminal court for the 
transfer to continued enforcement of sentence to be lawful. I would expect these 
instances to be obvious and usually to be known to the diplomatic representatives of the 
UK at the time of trial.119 
One has to recall that in this case the prisoner had categorically stated that his consent to be 
transferred to the UK was not voluntary as he had consented in order to avoid the ‘terrible’ 
prison conditions in which he was being held.120 The Court also assumes that the UK 
representatives abroad are always abreast with all the circumstances under which the trials of UK 
citizens are conducted. The reality is that some people would rather not refuse their transfer on 
the ground that their trial was unfair, after having exhausted all the available avenues of appeal or 
review, and challenge their transfer after they have arrived in the UK in the hope that the UK 
courts will ensure that justice is done.  
As the Court rightly observed, the fact that an offender has consented to be transferred to the 
UK does not mean that he forfeits his right to challenge his continued imprisonment on the 
basis that his trial was a flagrant denial of justice.121 On the question of whether the UK courts 
could, on the basis on Drozd release an offender convicted in a foreign country where there was a 
flagrant denial of justice, the Court added that: 
The solution to this dilemma cannot readily be found either in the short unreasoned 
obiter sentence of the ECtHR in Drozd and Janousek, requiring the receiving state not to 
co-operate with transfers. It did not have to face the problem arising here. It did not 
have to deal with the problem that, on the basis of his arguments, this claimant should 
have remained in custody and in very much worse conditions than those from which he 
has benefited on transfer. Nor did it have to deal with the problem that the consequence 
of his success in persuading the UK Government to co-operate with Thailand, to his 
own advantage and in a way which he now says it should not have done, is that others 
may well be left to languish in Thailand and elsewhere, after trials and for terms and in 
conditions which could infringe the very principles his arguments would uphold for 
him… The application of what the ECtHR said in these circumstances could thus be to 
achieve the very opposite of what it thought would be achieved in Drozd and Janousek. It 
did not have to deal with the way in which its obiter comment on the obligation to refuse 
co-operation could require the UK to undermine the intent of its international 
agreements as the alternative, for what probable short term difference it would make, 
until the transferring states refused their continued co-operation under the PTA, as they 
are entitled to do. The ECtHR cannot have envisaged that the obligation not to co-
operate should mean that transfers should be agreed on one basis and then given effect 
on another, in a way which would undermine the good faith of the requesting state. 
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These very real problems were simply not before it and were therefore understandably 
not addressed.122 
The Court seems to put a lot of emphasis on what it considered to the purpose of the transfer of 
prisoners agreement. It held that: ‘[t]he only purpose of the PTA is to enable the prisoner to 
serve the foreign term at home. The PTA is designed not to create an appeal against conviction 
or sentence after transfer, with UK/ECHR standards applying.’123 One has to recall that the 
purpose of the prisoner transfer agreement between the UK and Thailand is not just to return 
offenders to the UK to serve their sentences. The preamble to the agreement clearly states that 
the two countries signed that agreement with the desire ‘to facilitate the successful reintegration 
of the offenders into society.’ For an offender to be reintegrated into society, s/he has to be 
rehabilitated first. An offender who thinks that his/her continued imprisonment is unlawful may 
find it unattractive to take part in rehabilitation programmes. Firstly, s/he thinks that s/he 
should not be in prison. Related to the above, from a policy point of view, if Thailand gets to 
know that offenders transferred to the UK end up being released on the ground that their 
continued detention was a violation of their right to liberty because of the fact that their trial had 
flagrantly violated standards of fairness, it might end up refusing to consent to the transfer of 
offenders to the UK.  
But that does not mean that ‘a one-size fits all’ approach should be applicable with regards to all 
offenders transferred from Thailand. Each case should be examined and decided on its own 
individual facts and if there should be evidence that indeed the prisoner’s trial had flagrantly 
violated standards of fairness, then it should be presumed that a UK court would have to make 
that ruling because one person’s human rights should not have to be sacrificed for the hope only, 
of maintaining the prisoner transfer arrangement. A clear message has to be sent out to other 
countries, including Thailand, that the UK will not just rubberstamp their courts’ convictions. 
Subsequent cases have not cast doubt on the ECtHR decision in Drozd and Janousek and have 
indeed upheld the reasoning in that case.  
In Samantha Orobator v Governor of HMP Holloway and Secretary of State for Justice124 it was held that:  
[H]er claim that she has been detained in the UK unlawfully cannot succeed unless it is 
shown that she suffered a flagrant denial of justice in Laos. For the reasons that we have 
given, she has not been able to satisfy this high test. The test is rightly set very high. That 
is because it is important not to jeopardise or undermine the treaties for the repatriation 
of prisoners which the UK now has with many countries, so that those who are 
convicted abroad can serve their sentences here. If persons who have been convicted and 
sentenced abroad and have procured their transfer to the UK were easily able to obtain 
their liberty by challenging the fairness of their convictions, there would be a grave 
danger that these important treaties would be set at nought. That would be highly 
regrettable.125 
UK courts’ reluctance to hold that the transferred offender’s trial amounted to a flagrant denial 
of justice that justified termination of continued imprisonment in the UK may be attributed to 
the fact that the ECtHR Drozd and Janousek test that the trial should amount to a flagrant denial 
of justice has not been met by the applicants. However, that does not mean that there are no 
examples, though in another context, in which a conclusion has been reached that the offender’s 
trial amounted to or would amount to a flagrant denial of justice.  
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In Stoichkov v Bulgaria, the European Court of Human Rights held that: ‘criminal proceedings 
which have been held in absentia and whose re-opening has been subsequently refused, without 
any indication that the accused has waived his or her right to be present during the trial, may 
fairly be described as “manifestly contrary to the provisions of Article 6 or the principles 
embodied therein”.’126  
In Omar Othman Aka Abu Qatada v Secretary of State for the Home Department127 it was held that 
deporting the applicant to Jordan where ‘there was a real risk’ that evidence obtained by torture 
would be admitted at his retrial posed ‘a real risk that he would be subject to a flagrant denial of 
justice.’128 The above examples show that indeed there could be cases where a trial could be 
found to have been a flagrant denial of justice and that if a court found that the trial was indeed a 
flagrant denial of justice, the offender’s continued imprisonment in the UK would be a violation 
of his right to liberty. 
 
5. Extradition and transfer of offenders 
Another issue that has come-up in the context of prisoner transfer is the relationship between 
extraditions on the one hand, and on the other, offender transfers. The issue of extraditing a 
suspect from one European country to another is less of problem because of the existence of 
several instruments regulating extradition.129 Courts in the UK have emphasised the importance 
of extradition in fighting crime.130 Unlike extradition which is always almost used to ensure that 
suspects are returned to stand trial for the offences they allegedly committed, offender transfer is 
concerned with repatriating people who have already been convicted of offences and are 
returned to their countries to serve out the remainder of their sentences. The existence of a 
transfer of offender treaty or arrangement between the extraditing and the requesting country 
could be a factor to be considered in deciding whether or not to extradite a suspect or for the 
suspect to agree to surrender voluntarily to the requesting country to stand trial. This is 
important in the light of the fact that jurisprudence from the UK courts and the European Court 
of Human Rights is clear that extradition shall not take place if there are reasons to believe that 
the offender could be sentenced to a punishment that amounts to cruel or degrading 
treatment.131  
The issue of extradition becomes critical in situations where the prison conditions of the 
administering state are below internationally acceptable standards. This is an issue that has been 
raised by the Court of Justice of the European Community member states should not return 
people to countries where there is a real risk of being subjected to conditions of detention that 
amount to inhuman or degrading treatment.132  
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In McKinnon v Government of the United States of America and another133 the appellant, a British 
national, was wanted in the United States of America to stand trial for hacking into several 
government computers. The possibility of his transfer to the UK to serve the remainder of his 
sentence, if convicted and sentenced in the US, was highlighted as one of the issues he should 
consider for not opposing his extradition. A representative of the US Department of Justice 
informed appellant that: 
[H]e was authorised to offer the appellant a deal in return for not contesting extradition 
and for agreeing to plead guilty to two of the counts laid against him...On this basis it 
was likely that a sentence of 3–4 years (more precisely 37–46 months), probably at the 
shorter end of that bracket, would be passed and that after serving 6–12 months in the 
US, the appellant would be repatriated to complete his sentence in the UK. In this event 
his release date would be determined by reference to the UK’s remission rules namely, in 
the case of a sentence not exceeding four years, release at the discretion of the parole 
board after serving half the nominal sentence, release as of right at the two-thirds point. 
On that basis, he might serve a total of only some eighteen months to two years.134 
During the plea agreement negotiations, the applicant was informed that if he did not oppose his 
extradition, then ‘the prosecutor would recommend to the section of the US Department of 
Justice responsible for administering the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons that 
the appellant be transferred and this recommendation too was in practice likely to be 
accepted.’135 The applicant understood that statement to mean that if he had opposed his 
extradition and later extradited, the prosecution would not support his repatriation to the UK to 
serve his sentence.136 However, later an official from the US Attorney General’s Office presented 
an affidavit to the effect that his office would ‘not oppose any prisoner transfer application that 
may be made by Gary McKinnon (if extradited and convicted) based, in whole or in part, on his 
refusal to waive or consent to extradition from the United Kingdom’.137 In the light of the above 
assurance,138 the House of Lords held that: 
By the same token that a plea of guilty routinely attracts a lesser sentence, understandably 
it is likely also to attract a more sympathetic response to a repatriation request where, as 
here, that involves a greatly enhanced prospect of early release. After all, the extent of 
remission (the critical consideration in a request for repatriation from the US to the UK) 
affects the length of the prison sentence to be served no less than the nominal term 
itself.139 
The above decision shows the importance of the existence of a transfer of offenders agreement 
or arrangement in extradition cases. The possibility of the offender’s transfer to his/her country 
to serve his/her sentence could be invoked by the requesting country as a ‘carrot’ if the suspect 
does not oppose his extradition. In such cases the repatriation guarantee incentive could 
influence the suspect’s decision to either oppose or not oppose extradition. Courts will also 
consider the possibility of the person’s transfer as one of the factors in approving their 
extradition.  
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In Kerry Shanks or Howes v Her Majesty’s Advocate140 the appellant opposed her extradition to the 
USA on amongst other grounds that in the light of her mental state her extradition would be 
unjust and oppressive contrary to the Human Rights Act. The Court, in dismissing her 
application, held, inter alia, that in assessing the extent of risk of self-harm if transferred to the 
United States, ‘it is necessary to have regard to the possibility that the appellant may be acquitted, 
or given a non-custodial sentence or a short sentence of imprisonment, or transferred to 
Scotland to serve any sentence here.’141  
In Glen Howell v Deputy Attorney General Court of Appeal of Douai France142 the applicant opposed his 
extradition to France to serve a custodial sentence that had been imposed by a French court. In 
dismissing his application that his extradition would violate his right to family life, the Court 
held, inter alia, that: ‘[t]here is no indication…that the French authorities will refuse to consider’143 
the request by the UK authorities for the offender to be transferred to the UK to serve his 
sentence and consequently be in close proximity with his family members. Likewise, in HH v 
Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa; PH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa; F-K 
v Polish Judicial Authority,144 in rejecting HH and PH’s applications against their extradition on the 
ground that it would violate their right to family life, the Supreme Court, per Lord Mance, held 
that: 
In reaching my decision relating to HH and PH, I am—though this is not essential to my 
conclusion—comforted by the hope that it may be possible for both parents to be 
returned speedily to the UK to serve here the balances of their sentences under Council 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of November 27, 2008. The Court was informed 
that this Framework Decision has now been transposed into Italian law. Mr Perry QC’s 
instructions were that, under the previous regime of the Council of Europe Convention 
on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons of March 21, 1983, repatriation from Italy took 8 
to 12 months, although statistics for all repatriations from all Council of Europe 
countries show a longer average period of around 18 months. Whichever figure is taken, 
it is to be hoped that much speedier results can be achieved under the Framework 
Decision, the purpose of which is to limit the rupture of environmental and family links 
resulting from imprisonment abroad.145 
Of course courts will not likely allow the extradition of a person to a country to serve his/her 
sentence if s/he has been detained in a UK prison while awaiting extradition for the time that is 
equal to the sentence he would have served had s/he been extradited.146 It should be recalled that 
the offender does not have the right to be transferred and the European Court of Human Rights 
in Plepi v Albania and Greece147 has emphasised the fact that the Convention on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons confines itself to ‘providing the inter-state procedural framework for the 
transfer of sentenced persons and do[es] not generate any individual substantive rights per se.’148 
The Court concluded that the Convention does not ‘contain an obligation on the signatory states 
to comply with a request for transfer.’149  
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The Court also reiterated its position that the European Convention on Human Rights ‘does not 
grant prisoners the right to choose the place of detention.’150 The above jurisprudence shows the 
importance that the existence of a prisoner transfer agreement between countries could play in 
extradition cases. However, it should be recalled that the fact that the offender does not have a 
right to be transferred, and secondly, that States parties to the transfer treaties cannot be 
compelled to agree to the offender’s request to the transfer, meaning that even in cases where a 
person has been extradited on the ground that s/he could be transferred to serve his/her 
sentence in his/her country of nationality, such a person is not certain that s/he would be 
transferred.  
Plachta gives the example of the Extradition Act of The Netherlands in terms of which a Dutch 
national could be extradited to stand trial ‘if the Dutch Minister of Justice has good reason to 
believe that there is a sufficient guarantee that, once sentenced to unconditional custody in the 
requesting state for the offence for which his extradition has been granted, the offender would 
be able to serve his sentence in the Netherlands.’151   
 
6. Conclusion 
The UK has signed prisoner transfer agreements with over twenty countries and is a party to 
multilateral treaties on the transfer of offenders. The author has dealt with the issues that courts 
in the UK have grappled with regarding the offenders that have been transferred to the UK and 
those that have been extradited from the UK. The increasing role of human rights in the transfer 
of offenders has been discussed. Courts are increasingly called upon to deal with issues of 
offender transfer from a human rights as opposed to a policy perspective. The article shows that 
most of the agreements on the transfer of offenders between the UK and other countries 
emphasise rehabilitation as the objective of the transfer but that courts have not expressly stated 
that indeed that is the purpose of the transfer. The issue of conversion versus continued 
enforcement of transferred sentences has resulted into conflicting decisions from different UK 
courts with some converting the sentences and others emphasising that legislation in the UK 
does not empower courts to convert transferred sentences.  
It has been demonstrated in this article that the correct approach is that UK courts do not have 
the power to convert transferred sentences. It is recommended that where possible that UK 
should consider entering into agreements that give it the option of converting sentences in 
question so that clearly excessive sentences are not adopted, and outcomes of unfair trials abroad 
maintained after transfer. Another issue that some courts have dealt with relates to the policy 
considerations on the transfer of offenders to the UK on the one hand and the human rights 
issues on the other hand. The jurisprudence shows that there is yet to be a case in which an 
offender has been released after his/her transfer to the UK on the ground that his/her trial was 
a flagrant denial of justice. One gets the impression that courts are more concerned with 
ensuring that as many British nationals as possible benefit from the transfer programme. In 
order not to frustrate that programme, courts require that a trial should have been of such a 
nature that the prisoner did not get justice at all.   
However, human rights issues are slowly but surely taking root in the transfer of offender 
regime. This is evidenced by the fact that many prisoner transfer agreement include implied 
human rights such as the right not to be subjected to double jeopardy and the right to access 
information. Some agreements include express human rights such as the right to freedom from 
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torture. There is also emerging human rights jurisprudence on rights such as freedom from 
torture, family life and one hopes that this jurisprudence will continue to develop and offer 
better protection to offenders. 
